

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate regarding Iran.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—110th Cong., 1st Sess.

H. R. 1585

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on _____ and
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. LIEBERMAN
(for himself and Mr. KYL)

Viz:

1 At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

2 **SEC. 1535. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following
4 findings:

5 (1) General David Petraeus, commander of the
6 Multi-National Force Iraq, stated in testimony be-
7 fore a joint session of the Committee on Armed
8 Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of

1 the House of Representatives on September 10,
2 2007, that “[i]t is increasingly apparent to both coa-
3 lition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use
4 of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Qods Force,
5 seeks to turn the Shi’a militia extremists into a
6 Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight
7 a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition
8 forces in Iraq”.

9 (2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States
10 Ambassador to Iraq, stated in testimony before a
11 joint session of the Committee on Armed Services
12 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
13 of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that
14 “Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming
15 to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively
16 undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the
17 enemies of the Iraqi state”.

18 (3) The most recent National Intelligence Esti-
19 mate on Iraq, published in August 2007, states that
20 “Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal sup-
21 port for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, par-
22 ticularly the JAM [Jaysh al-Mahdi], since at least
23 the beginning of 2006. Explosively formed pene-
24 trator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically”.

1 (4) The Report of the Independent Commission
2 on the Security Forces of Iraq, released on Sep-
3 tember 6, 2007, states that “[t]he Commission con-
4 cludes that the evidence of Iran’s increasing activism
5 in the southeastern part of the country, including
6 Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. . . It is an
7 accepted fact that most of the sophisticated weapons
8 being used to ‘defeat’ our armor protection comes
9 across the border from Iran with relative impunity”.

10 (5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of
11 the Independent Commission on the Security Forces
12 of Iraq, stated in testimony before the Committee on
13 Armed Services of the Senate on September 6, 2007,
14 that “[w]e judge that the goings-on across the Ira-
15 nian border in particular are of extreme severity and
16 have the potential of at least delaying our efforts in-
17 side the country. Many of the arms and weapons
18 that kill and maim our soldiers are coming from
19 across the Iranian border”.

20 (6) General Petraeus said of Iranian support
21 for extremist activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that
22 “[w]e know that it goes as high as [Brig. Gen.
23 Qassem] Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods
24 Force. . . We believe that he works directly for the
25 supreme leader of the country”.

1 (7) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of
2 Iran, stated on August 28, 2007, with respect to the
3 United States presence in Iraq, that “[t]he political
4 power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon we
5 will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of
6 course we are prepared to fill the gap”.

7 (8) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress,
8 with respect to President Ahmedinejad’s statement,
9 on September 11, 2007, that “[t]he Iranian involve-
10 ment in Iraq—its support for extremist militias,
11 training, connections to Lebanese Hezbollah, provi-
12 sion of munitions that are used against our force as
13 well as the Iraqis—are all, in my view, a pretty clear
14 demonstration that Ahmedinejad means what he
15 says, and is already trying to implement it to the
16 best of his ability”.

17 (9) General Petraeus stated on September 12,
18 2007, with respect to evidence of the complicity of
19 Iran in the murder of members of the Armed Forces
20 of the United States in Iraq, that “[t]he evidence is
21 very, very clear. We captured it when we captured
22 Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy com-
23 mander, and others, and it’s in black and white...
24 We interrogated these individuals. We have on
25 tape... Qais Khazali himself. When asked, could you

1 have done what you have done without Iranian sup-
2 port, he literally throws up his hands and laughs
3 and says, of course not... So they told us about the
4 amounts of money that they have received. They told
5 us about the training that they received. They told
6 us about the ammunition and sophisticated weap-
7 onry and all of that that they received”.

8 (10) General Petraeus further stated on Sep-
9 tember 14, 2007, that “[w]hat we have got is evi-
10 dence. This is not intelligence. This is evidence, off
11 computers that we captured, documents and so
12 forth... In one case, a 22-page document that lays
13 out the planning, reconnaissance, rehearsal, conduct,
14 and aftermath of the operation conducted that re-
15 sulted in the death of five of our soldiers in Karbala
16 back in January”.

17 (11) The Department of Defense report to Con-
18 gress entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in
19 Iraq” and released on September 18, 2007, con-
20 sistent with section 9010 of Public Law 109–289,
21 states that “[t]here has been no decrease in Iranian
22 training and funding of illegal Shi’a militias in Iraq
23 that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces and civil-
24 ians... Tehran’s support for these groups is one of

1 the greatest impediments to progress on reconcili-
2 ation”.

3 (12) The Department of Defense report further
4 states, with respect to Iranian support for Shi’a ex-
5 tremist groups in Iraq, that “[m]ost of the explo-
6 sives and ammunition used by these groups are pro-
7 vided by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard
8 Corps—Qods Force... For the period of June
9 through the end of August, [explosively formed pene-
10 trator] events are projected to rise by 39 percent
11 over the period of March through May”.

12 (13) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has
13 held three rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq secu-
14 rity with representatives of the Government of the
15 Islamic Republic of Iran.

16 (14) Ambassador Crocker testified before Con-
17 gress on September 10, 2007, with respect to these
18 talks, stating that “I laid out the concerns we had
19 over Iranian activity that was damaging to Iraq’s se-
20 curity, but found no readiness on Iranians’ side at
21 all to engage seriously on these issues. The impres-
22 sion I came with after a couple rounds is that the
23 Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of
24 discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the
25 U.S. as an arbiter of Iraq’s present and future, rath-

1 er than actually doing serious business...Right now,
2 I haven't seen any sign of earnest or seriousness on
3 the Iranian side".

4 (15) Ambassador Crocker testified before Con-
5 gress on September 11, 2007, stating that "[w]e
6 have seen nothing on the ground that would suggest
7 that the Iranians are altering what they're doing in
8 support of extremist elements that are going after
9 our forces as well as the Iraqis".

10 (16) Ambassador Crocker further testified be-
11 fore Congress on September 11, 2007, with respect
12 to talks with Iran, that "I think that it's an option
13 that we want to preserve. Our first couple of rounds
14 did not produce anything. I don't think that we
15 should either, therefore, be in a big hurry to have
16 another round, nor do I think we should say we're
17 not going to talk anymore... I do believe it's impor-
18 tant to keep the option for further discussions on
19 the table".

20 (17) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated
21 on September 16, 2007, that "I think that the ad-
22 ministration believes at this point that continuing to
23 try and deal with the Iranian threat, the Iranian
24 challenge, through diplomatic and economic means is
25 by far the preferable approach. That's the one we

1 are using... We always say all options are on the
2 table, but clearly, the diplomatic and economic ap-
3 proach is the one that we are pursuing”.

4 (b) SENSE OF SENATE.—It is the sense of the Sen-
5 ate—

6 (1) that the manner in which the United States
7 transitions and structures its military presence in
8 Iraq will have critical long-term consequences for the
9 future of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, in
10 particular with regard to the capability of the Gov-
11 ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pose a
12 threat to the security of the region, the prospects for
13 democracy for the people of the region, and the
14 health of the global economy;

15 (2) that it is a critical national interest of the
16 United States to prevent the Government of the Is-
17 lamic Republic of Iran from turning Shi’a militia ex-
18 tremists in Iraq into a Hezbollah-like force that
19 could serve its interests inside Iraq, including by
20 overwhelming, subverting, or co-opting institutions
21 of the legitimate Government of Iraq;

22 (3) that it should be the policy of the United
23 States to stop inside Iraq the violent activities and
24 destabilizing influence of the Government of the Is-
25 lamic Republic of Iran, its foreign facilitators such

1 as Lebanese Hezbollah, and its indigenous Iraqi
2 proxies;

3 (4) to support the prudent and calibrated use
4 of all instruments of United States national power
5 inside Iraq, including diplomatic, economic, intel-
6 ligence, and military instruments, in support of the
7 policy with respect to the Government of the Islamic
8 Republic of Iran and its proxies;

9 (5) that the United States should designate the
10 Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign
11 terrorist organization under section 219 of the Im-
12 migration and Nationality Act and place the Islamic
13 Revolutionary Guards Corps on the list of Specially
14 Designated Global Terrorists, as established under
15 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
16 and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and

17 (6) that the Department of the Treasury should
18 act with all possible expediency to complete the list-
19 ing of those entities targeted under United Nations
20 Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 adopt-
21 ed unanimously on December 23, 2006 and March
22 24, 2007, respectively.